The importance of consistency in decision-making has been increasingly recognised in English administrative law. The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Gallaher, in which consistency is said not to be a free-standing administrative law principle, is thus both surprising and questionable.
In a new paper, I examine the way in which judges in the UK respond to ouster clauses — and reflect on what such responses might tell us about the nature of the contemporary British constitution and the courts’ perception of their place within it
In the Privacy International case, the Court of Appeal accepted that an ouster clause precluded judicial review of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Sales LJ contended that the issue turned on ‘a short point of statutory construction’. The reality, however, is that such cases take the courts into the deepest of constitutional waters.
The Unison case is an important victory for workers who wish to enforce their rights in Employment Tribunals. But the Supreme Court’s judgment also implicates some key principles of UK constitutional law — and raises a question about how far courts can go in upholding such principles.
In Secretary of State for Work & Pensions v Carmichael, the Government argued that the First-tier Tribunal could not intervene when housing benefit was reduced under ECHR-incompatible regulations. The Upper Tribunal disagreed. In doing so, it was on strong constitutional ground.
One of the first posts I wrote on this blog concerned the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v First-tier Tribunal  UKSC 19. At the heart of the case was the distinction between questions of […]