This is the final in my series of four posts concerning the Report of the Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) and the Government’s Response to it. Focussing particularly on the direction of travel that is envisaged in the latter, I have addressed the potential implications for the doctrine of nullity, the efficacy of ouster clauses and the courts’ … Continue reading Judicial review reform IV: Culture war? Two visions of the UK constitution
Tag: Administrative Law
In the first and second posts in this series on the Report of the Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) and the Government’s Response to it, I addressed questions surrounding the doctrine of nullity, potential changes to the effect of remedies and the Government’s wish to reinvigorate ouster clauses. All of those proposals are united by at least one … Continue reading Judicial review reform III: Substantive review and the courts’ constitutional role
In my first post on the Report of the Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) and the Government’s Response to it, I considered proposals concerning the status of unlawful administrative action and the limitation of the effect of remedies. I turn, in this second post in the series, to the matter of ouster clauses (on … Continue reading Judicial review reform II: Ouster clauses and the rule of law
Having considered, in my first two posts in this series, the general scope and underlying agenda of the Government’s Review of judicial review and the possibility of codifying the grounds of review, I turn now to the matter of justiciability. If the Review’s terms of reference are generally sparse, what they have to say about … Continue reading The Judicial Review Review III: Limiting judicial review by ‘clarifying’ non-justiciability — or putting lipstick on the proverbial pig
In my first post on the Review of judicial review, I noted, among other things, the potentially far-reaching nature of the recommendations that might emerge, bearing in mind the Review’s notably broad terms of reference. As I also noted in my first post, the underlying agenda is plainly the limitation of the courts’ powers and … Continue reading The Judicial Review Review II: Codifying Judicial Review — Clarification or Evisceration?
The UK Government has announced a review of judicial review — the Independent Review of Administrative Law — with notably broad terms of reference. This post is the first in a series that will consider some of the potential changes to judicial review that the Government appears to be contemplating. Subsequent posts, which will be … Continue reading The Judicial Review Review I: The Reform Agenda and its Potential Scope
In my first post on the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in In the matter of an application by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review [2019] UKSC 7, I considered the Court’s approach to the relevance (or otherwise) of reliance in legitimate expectation cases, and looked at the way in which the case highlights the less than … Continue reading The Supreme Court’s judgment in Finucane — II: Three unanswered questions concerning the doctrine of legitimate expectation
This is the first of two posts on the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in In the matter of an application by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review [2019] UKSC 7. The second post can be found here. Legitimate expectation has long occupied an uncertain place within the broader doctrinal landscape of English administrative law. It sits, … Continue reading The Supreme Court’s judgment in Finucane — I: Legitimate expectations, reliance, procedure and substance
The importance of consistency in decision-making has been increasingly recognised in English administrative law. The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Gallaher, in which consistency is said not to be a free-standing administrative law principle, is thus both surprising and questionable.
In a new paper, I examine the way in which judges in the UK respond to ouster clauses — and reflect on what such responses might tell us about the nature of the contemporary British constitution and the courts' perception of their place within it
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