Tag: Administrative Law

Consistency as a free-standing principle of administrative law?

The importance of consistency in decision-making has been increasingly recognised in English administrative law. The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Gallaher, in which consistency is said not to be a free-standing administrative law principle, is thus both surprising and questionable.

Through the Looking-Glass? Ouster Clauses, Statutory Interpretation and the British Constitution

In a new paper, I examine the way in which judges in the UK respond to ouster clauses — and reflect on what such responses might tell us about the nature of the contemporary British constitution and the courts’ perception of their place within it

Privacy International in the Court of Appeal: Anisminic distinguished — again

In the Privacy International case, the Court of Appeal accepted that an ouster clause precluded judicial review of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Sales LJ contended that the issue turned on ‘a short point of statutory construction’. The reality, however, is that such cases take the courts into the deepest of constitutional waters.

Unison in the Supreme Court: Tribunal Fees, Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law

The Unison case is an important victory for workers who wish to enforce their rights in Employment Tribunals. But the Supreme Court’s judgment also implicates some key principles of UK constitutional law — and raises a question about how far courts can go in upholding such principles.

Elliott & Thomas: Public Law

Written by Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law is the UK’s best-selling textbook in the field. The following post is based on the preface to the third edition, which was published by Oxford University Press in 2017.

The “bedroom tax”, Convention rights and secondary legislation

In Secretary of State for Work & Pensions v Carmichael, the Government argued that the First-tier Tribunal could not intervene when housing benefit was reduced under ECHR-incompatible regulations. The Upper Tribunal disagreed. In doing so, it was on strong constitutional ground.

Discarding the fig-leaf of analytical reasoning? The Hutton case and the law/fact distinction

One of the first posts I wrote on this blog concerned the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones  v First-tier Tribunal [2013] UKSC 19. At the heart of the case was the distinction between questions of […]