The “Black Spider Memos” case resulted in the publication of some rather pedestrian correspondence between Prince Charles and Government Ministers. But the Supreme Court’s judgment raises some fascinating constitutional issues
Tag: rule of law
Ouster clauses raise difficult questions about the relationship between the constitutional principles of the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament — as the disagreement between the two judges in this case demonstrates
The legitimate extent of judicial authority is a perennial and thorny question. In this lecture, I address the question from the perspective of public law — and, in particular, with reference to the role that judges play in relation to “constitution-making”.
The Judicial Power Project has published a list of 50 “problematic” cases. It makes for interesting reading. The aim of the Judicial Power Project is to address the “problem” of “judicial overreach” which, it is said, “increasingly threatens the rule of law and effective, democratic government”. It is odd, therefore, to find on Judicial Power’s
The rule of law is an axiomatic part of the British constitution. But in order to understand the rule of law properly, it is necessary to consider the specific principles for which it stands — and, just as importantly, what can (and cannot) be done in order to uphold those principles.
The legal saga concerning the “black-spider memos” that Prince Charles is in the habit of sending to Ministers, inflicting upon them his often-eccentric views, is a long one. It has its origins in freedom-of-information requests issued to several Government departments by a Guardian journalist. Disclosure was sought of “advocacy correspondence” — that is, letters setting
Over the last couple of weeks, I have been teaching new Constitutional Law students in Cambridge about the fundamental, architectural aspects of the UK constitution, including the rule of law, the separation of powers and the sovereignty of Parliament. The House of Lords’ rejection earlier this week of parts of a Government Bill that aimed
Last night, Lord Neuberger, the President of the UK Supreme Court, gave the 2013 Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture. His text, available here, is worth reading in full, but here are some choice excerpts. The rule of law, said Lord Neuberger, “can mean different things”: At its most basic, the expression connotes a system under which the relationship between
I wrote recently about the what might happen if—as is an increasingly less-fanciful prospect—human rights law in the UK were to be fundamentally altered through repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and perhaps even withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights. In that piece, I suggested that while such changes would be far from insignificant,
The case concerning the reinterring of the recently-discovered remains of Richard III has already attracted comment, including an excellent piece by Tom Hickman on the UK Constitutional Law Blog. I wish to make only some brief observations about paragraphs 20-21 of Haddon-Cave J’s permission decision: Section 25 of the Burial Act 1857 confers an unfettered