Supreme Court judgments addressing—but not resolving—the future direction of substantive judicial review have been coming thick and fast in the last year or two. Notable examples include Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 (on which I posted here), Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 (blog post) and … Continue reading Youssef: Another Supreme Court decision, another set of obiter dicta on substantive judicial review
Tag: judicial review
The following is a response to Professor John Finnis's recent lecture on judicial power. Professor Finnis's lecture, and this response, form part of Policy Exchange's Judicial Power Project. The following response was first published on the Judicial Power Project's website and is reproduced here with permission. Professor John Finnis’s lecture on judicial power, part of Policy … Continue reading Judicial Power in Normative, Institutional and Doctrinal Perspective: A Response to Professor Finnis
I am pleased to be able to share a near-final draft of my chapter in The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Judicial Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow. The book is a collection of essays, inspired by the work of the late Professor Michael Taggart, and edited by Hanna Wilberg and me. It will be published shortly … Continue reading Book chapter: From Bifurcation to Calibration — Twin-Track Deference and the Culture of Justification
The recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 marks a turning-point in the role of proportionality as a common-law ground of judicial review. Although the case did not ultimately turn upon proportionality, the judgments contain detailed discussion of the doctrine, and evidence … Continue reading Proportionality and contextualism in common-law review: The Supreme Court’s judgment in Pham
I posted here about the decision of Stewart J in R (Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills. The case concerns a challenge to the lawfulness of UK Government allocations of EU funds to different parts of the UK, the essential argument being that the basis upon which such allocations were made … Continue reading The Rotherham case in the Supreme Court: Deference, reasonableness and proportionality
The House of Lords returned again yesterday to the implications for judicial review of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill. (I have written about the Bill in several previous posts, the most recent of which can be found here.) The speech made by Lord Pannick in yesterday's House of Lords debate sets out in emphatic and … Continue reading Lord Pannick on judicial review
I have written on several previous occasions — most recently in this post — about the Government's attempts to restrict access to judicial review through the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill and, in particular, about the attempts of the Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling MP, to justify the Government's position. As part of ongoing legislative ping-pong … Continue reading From bad to worse: The Justice Secretary on judicial review
I recently completed work on a book, co-edited with Hanna Wilberg of The University of Auckland, entitled The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart's Rainbow. The book will be published in 2015 by Hart Publishing. In the meantime, a copy of the editors' introduction can be downloaded here. Inspired by the work of Professor Michael Taggart, … Continue reading Wilberg and Elliott (eds): The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow
The House of Commons yesterday voted to reverse amendments made by the House of Lords to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill. I have written about the Bill, and the House of Lords’ amendments, previously — most recently here — and will not go into detail about the substance of the Bill or the Lords’ … Continue reading The Justice Secretary on Judicial Review: Five Basic Misconceptions
Over the last couple of weeks, I have been teaching new Constitutional Law students in Cambridge about the fundamental, architectural aspects of the UK constitution, including the rule of law, the separation of powers and the sovereignty of Parliament. The House of Lords’ rejection earlier this week of parts of a Government Bill that aimed … Continue reading What a (for now failed) attempt to curb judicial review tells us about the UK’s constitution
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