Today's Sunday Telegraph features an extraordinary interview with the UK Government's Justice Secretary, Dominic Raab. The report raises three issues of significant constitutional concern: that the Government may be contemplating further changes to judicial review in the light of recent judgments to which it takes exception; that the Government is considering undermining through domestic law … Continue reading Undermining the rule of law? A comment on the Justice Secretary’s Sunday Telegraph interview
Tag: judicial review
This is the final in my series of four posts concerning the Report of the Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) and the Government’s Response to it. Focussing particularly on the direction of travel that is envisaged in the latter, I have addressed the potential implications for the doctrine of nullity, the efficacy of ouster clauses and the courts’ … Continue reading Judicial review reform IV: Culture war? Two visions of the UK constitution
In the first and second posts in this series on the Report of the Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) and the Government’s Response to it, I addressed questions surrounding the doctrine of nullity, potential changes to the effect of remedies and the Government’s wish to reinvigorate ouster clauses. All of those proposals are united by at least one … Continue reading Judicial review reform III: Substantive review and the courts’ constitutional role
In my first post on the Report of the Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL) and the Government’s Response to it, I considered proposals concerning the status of unlawful administrative action and the limitation of the effect of remedies. I turn, in this second post in the series, to the matter of ouster clauses (on … Continue reading Judicial review reform II: Ouster clauses and the rule of law
This is the first in a series of four short posts reflecting on the Government’s response to the Independent Review of Administrative Law (IRAL). Although the Government set notably broad terms of reference for the Review (on which I commented here), the IRAL report itself is generally measured and eschews many of the far-reaching reform … Continue reading Judicial review reform I: Nullity, remedies and constitutional gaslighting
The days of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 — adopted almost a decade ago as part of the Coalition Agreement between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties — appear to be numbered. The Government has published draft legislation to repeal the Act along with a statement of principles concerning the exercise of the prerogative power … Continue reading Repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act
Having considered, in my first two posts in this series, the general scope and underlying agenda of the Government’s Review of judicial review and the possibility of codifying the grounds of review, I turn now to the matter of justiciability. If the Review’s terms of reference are generally sparse, what they have to say about … Continue reading The Judicial Review Review III: Limiting judicial review by ‘clarifying’ non-justiciability — or putting lipstick on the proverbial pig
In my first post on the Review of judicial review, I noted, among other things, the potentially far-reaching nature of the recommendations that might emerge, bearing in mind the Review’s notably broad terms of reference. As I also noted in my first post, the underlying agenda is plainly the limitation of the courts’ powers and … Continue reading The Judicial Review Review II: Codifying Judicial Review — Clarification or Evisceration?
The UK Government has announced a review of judicial review — the Independent Review of Administrative Law — with notably broad terms of reference. This post is the first in a series that will consider some of the potential changes to judicial review that the Government appears to be contemplating. Subsequent posts, which will be … Continue reading The Judicial Review Review I: The Reform Agenda and its Potential Scope
The importance of consistency in decision-making has been increasingly recognised in English administrative law. The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Gallaher, in which consistency is said not to be a free-standing administrative law principle, is thus both surprising and questionable.