Tag: freedom of information

The “Black Spider Memos” Case: An Introduction to Constitutional Law

The “Black Spider Memos” case resulted in the publication of some rather pedestrian correspondence between Prince Charles and Government Ministers. But the Supreme Court’s judgment raises some fascinating constitutional issues

A postscript on the Evans case: The report of the Independent Commission on Freedom of Information and the Government’s response

The so-called black-spider memos written by Prince Charles to Government Ministers turned out to be rather more pedestrian than many had anticipated. But the judgment of the Supreme Court in R (Evans) v Attorney-General [2015] UKSC 21, handed down in March 2015, requiring the disclosure of the correspondence, was anything but pedestrian. Indeed, as I

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New paper: A Tangled Constitutional Web — The Black-Spider Memos and the British Constitution’s Relational Architecture

I have written before about the Evans case concerning the Government’s attempt to block the release under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 of correspondence between the Prince of Wales and Ministers. I have now completed work on an article on this case that will appear in the October 2015 issue of the journal Public Law. The

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Of Black Spiders and Constitutional Bedrock: The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Evans

The legal saga concerning the “black-spider memos” that Prince Charles is in the habit of sending to Ministers, inflicting upon them his often-eccentric views, is a long one. It has its origins in freedom-of-information requests issued to several Government departments by a Guardian journalist. Disclosure was sought of “advocacy correspondence” — that is, letters setting

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Reasonableness review and the Court of Appeal’s decision in the Prince Charles correspondence case

I have written before about the saga concerning the disclosure of so-called advocacy correspondence sent by Prince Charles to Government Departments: in particular, about the Upper Tribunal’s decision, holding that the correspondence had to be released under the Freedom of Information Act 2000; the Attorney-General’s subsequent decision to use the “veto” power under that Act

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Prince Charles, freedom of information, judicial review and the separation of powers: R (Evans) v Attorney-General

The Administrative Court gave judgment earlier today in R (Evans) v Attorney-General [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin). The case concerns a challenge to the legality of the Attorney-General’s decision to use s 53 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to block the disclosure of letters written to Ministers by Prince Charles. The s 53 veto

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