The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 gives extraordinary law-making powers to the Government. Parliament sought to counterbalance those powers with a bespoke system for scrutinising their exercise. But is the Government now undermining those arrangements?
Brexit is placing the UK constitution under unprecedented strain. This article, originally published online by Prospect magazine, takes stock of where Brexit currently stands in domestic-constitutional terms
Mark Elliott, Jack Williams and Alison L Young introduce The UK Constitution After Miller: Brexit and Beyond — an edited collection published by Hart Publishing which explores the constitutional implications and legacy of the UK Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in the Miller case
The judgment of the UK Supreme Court in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union — in which legal capacity of the Government to trigger the UK’s withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union was tested — is of fundamental legal, constitutional and political signiﬁcance. … Continue reading The UK Constitution After Miller: Brexit and Beyond
In this post, Mark Elliott, Stephen Tierney and Alison L Young consider the implications of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill for human rights protection — and how the Bill might be amended if the protections afforded by the Charter of Fundamental Rights are to be maintained after Brexit
In the preliminary agreement concerning the terms of Brexit, the UK Government promises to give EU citizens’ rights direct effect in UK law and to make them legally ironclad unless the legislating giving effect to them is itself expressly repealed. But does the principle of parliamentary sovereignty prevent such a high degree of protection from being accorded to citizens’ rights?
Some senior MPs have suggested that Parliament could stop Brexit in its tracks in a ‘no deal’ scenario. The reality, however, is far more complex. Parliament might be sovereign, but there are limits to what even it can legally achieve.
Talk of a ‘transitional’ or ‘implementation’ period as a means of smoothing the UK’s departure from the EU is now commonplace. But how would it work legally? A new briefing paper to which I have contributed explores that question.
The third edition of Public Law was published by Oxford University Press in May 2017. This is the last in a series of posts by the authors, Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, taking the 2017 election and Brexit as reference points and updating readers on recent developments in the field. These posts are based on updates first published by Oxford University Press in the book’s Online Resource Centre.
The Prime Minister has been warned of possible legal action on the issue of whether the UK can leave the EU without a second referendum. But does the European Union Act 2011 really require a further plebiscite?