Mark Elliott and Stephen Tierney summarise the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s report on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, and highlight some of the key constitutional implications raised by the Committee
In a new paper, I examine the way in which judges in the UK respond to ouster clauses — and reflect on what such responses might tell us about the nature of the contemporary British constitution and the courts’ perception of their place within it
Does the Government defeat on clause 9 of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill mean Parliament has ‘taken back control’?
In the Government’s first defeat on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Parliament has insisted that a withdrawal agreement cannot be implemented without its approval. But does that really mean that Parliament is now in the driving seat when it comes to shaping the terms of Brexit?
In the preliminary agreement concerning the terms of Brexit, the UK Government promises to give EU citizens’ rights direct effect in UK law and to make them legally ironclad unless the legislating giving effect to them is itself expressly repealed. But does the principle of parliamentary sovereignty prevent such a high degree of protection from being accorded to citizens’ rights?
In the Privacy International case, the Court of Appeal accepted that an ouster clause precluded judicial review of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Sales LJ contended that the issue turned on ‘a short point of statutory construction’. The reality, however, is that such cases take the courts into the deepest of constitutional waters.
In this paper, published in a special issue of the University of Queensland Law Journal, I chart the growth of judicial power in the United Kingdom and consider how the proper limits of such power might be identified
Some senior MPs have suggested that Parliament could stop Brexit in its tracks in a ‘no deal’ scenario. The reality, however, is far more complex. Parliament might be sovereign, but there are limits to what even it can legally achieve.