In my first post on the Review of judicial review, I noted, among other things, the potentially far-reaching nature of the recommendations that might emerge, bearing in mind the Review’s notably broad terms of reference. As I also noted in my first post, the underlying agenda is plainly the limitation of the courts’ powers and … Continue reading The Judicial Review Review II: Codifying Judicial Review — Clarification or Evisceration?
Category: Constitutional Law
The UK Government has announced a review of judicial review — the Independent Review of Administrative Law — with notably broad terms of reference. This post is the first in a series that will consider some of the potential changes to judicial review that the Government appears to be contemplating. Subsequent posts, which will be … Continue reading The Judicial Review Review I: The Reform Agenda and its Potential Scope
I recently completed work on an article for a special issue of the Japanese legal journal Horitsu Jiho. The theme of the special issue is the impact of the forces of globalisation and nationalism on constitutional law and the study of it. In my contribution, I consider the potential implications of the United Kingdom's departure … Continue reading The United Kingdom’s constitution and Brexit: A ‘constitutional moment’?
This short piece, which forms part of my 1,000 words series of posts, aims to set out in an accessible way the key points of the Supreme Court's judgment in the Cherry/Miller (No 2) case. For a more detailed and technical analysis of the judgment, see this post. In its historic judgment in Cherry/Miller (No … Continue reading 1,000 words / The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Cherry/Miller (No 2)
The following is my detailed, initial analysis of the Supreme Court's judgment in the Cherry/Miller (No 2) case. For a shorter explanation of the case, see this 1,000 words post. Reactions to the unanimous Supreme Court judgment in Cherry/Miller (No 2)  UKSC 41 have been as strong as they have been diverse. On one … Continue reading A new approach to constitutional adjudication? Miller II in the Supreme Court
A good deal has been said in recent days about whether the Government’s advice to the Queen concerning the prorogation of Parliament raises a legal question on which courts can properly adjudicate. As is well-known, English and Scottish courts have so far differed sharply on this point: in the Cherry case, the Inner House of … Continue reading Prorogation and justiciability: Some thoughts ahead of the Miller II case in the Supreme Court
Earlier today, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, Stephen Barclay MP, posted a tweet saying that he had “signed the legislation setting in stone the repeal” of the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA). (The ECA is the UK statute that gives effect to EU law in the UK’s domestic legal system.) He … Continue reading The Brexit Secretary says he has “set in stone” the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 — but the legal significance of this misleading claim is very limited
The following letter was published in The Times on 12 August 2019. It responds to an article, published in the same newspaper on 9 August, in which Professor Vernon Bogdanor made a number of suggestions about Parliament’s capacity to prevent a no-deal Brexit. (Some of the same suggestions were also made in a Guardian article … Continue reading Letter to The Times: Parliament’s (limited) capacity to prevent a no-deal Brexit
Boris Johnson, the UK’s new Prime Minister, says that the UK will leave the EU on 31 October “do or die”. With negotiations between the UK and the EU apparently at an impasse, the likelihood of a no-deal Brexit now appears to be somewhat greater than the “million-to-one against” chance to which Johnson referred in … Continue reading Can Parliament prevent a no-deal Brexit?
A good deal has been written over the last couple of weeks about the granting of Royal Assent to legislation — and, in particular, about whether the Government can prevent a Bill from becoming law by advising against, or delaying putting it forward for, Royal Assent. That so much has been written on this topic … Continue reading Royal Assent and constitutional principle: A further response to John Finnis