The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has submitted a response to the Ministry of Justice’s latest proposals (a summary of which I posted here) concerning judicial review. Those proposals […]
This post is a working paper. It contains some ideas I am developing for a longer piece which will appear in an edited collection on substantive judicial review. This working paper, […]
The Ministry of Justice has published a consultation paper on Judicial Review: Proposals for Further Reform. Here is a brief summary of the main proposals: Planning judicial reviews would be transferred […]
According to today’s Daily Mail, the government will shortly be launching a consultation on limiting access to judicial review. It reports: Charities and ‘professional’ campaign groups will no longer be allowed […]
The government’s power to terminate judicial review cases, the rule of law, and the limits of political constitutionalism
A Tunisian man, whose British wife and son live in the UK, is excluded from the country on national security grounds. He challenges that exclusion decision by way of judicial review, but the government “terminates” the proceedings. If that sounds like a Kafkaesque nightmare, then think again. Precisely that factual matrix was at stake in R (Ignaoua) v Secretary of […]
The Hart Publishing journal Judicial Review has published a special issue concerning the government’s legal aid proposals. The special issue contains a joint opinion written by Michael Fordham, Ben Jaffey and […]
Standing, judicial review and the rule of law: why we all have a “direct interest” in government according to law
According to reports in today’s Times (£) and Telegraph, the government is planning a further set of reforms to judicial review. (I have written before about why the original proposals, published in December 2012, were objectionable—and about the fact that the government pressed ahead with many, but not all, of them, excoriating criticism notwithstanding.) Today, it is said that the Ministry […]
Jurisdictional error and the law/fact distinction: Jones (by Caldwell) v First-tier Tribunal  UKSC 19
Earlier today, the Supreme Court gave judgment in Jones (by Caldwell) v First-tier Tribunal  UKSC 19. It contains an interesting discussion of the distinction between errors of fact and of law, and, I think, provides a further insight (following its decision in R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal  UKSC 28) into the Supreme Court’s approach to administrative law.
I am working on some online updates for my Administrative Law book at present. In the course of doing so, I came across R (S) v Secretary of State for Justice  EWHC 1810 (Admin) – in which Sales J has some interesting (but debatable) things to say about the margin of appreciation doctrine.