Public Law for Everyone
Professor Mark Elliott
To say that the extent to which Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights applies to administrative decision-making is a vexed issue would be something of an understatement. […]
In September 2014,together with my colleagues John Bell, Jason Varuhas and Philip Murray, I co-convened a conference in Cambridge on the subject of Process and Substance in Public Law—the first in […]
I recently finished work on a paper examining the development of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Entitled ‘From Heresy to Orthodoxy: Substantive Legitimate Expectations in English Public Law’, the piece […]
Supreme Court judgments addressing—but not resolving—the future direction of substantive judicial review have been coming thick and fast in the last year or two. Notable examples include Kennedy v The […]
Under Chris Grayling’s stewardship of the Ministry of Justice, the view took hold—ample evidence to the contrary notwithstanding—that too many claims for judicial review were being initiated, and that judicial review was being used abusively for ‘political’ purposes. One of the ill-conceived ideas that grew out of this unfounded notion was that courts should be required to withhold relief in judicial-review […]
Twelve years ago, the Court of Appeal said—in R (Association of British Civilian Internees (Far East Region)) v Secretary of State for Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473—that, given its perceived […]
The Supreme Court gave judgment today in Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 59. The question for the Court was whether the UK Border Agency had acted […]
Building on the success of the inaugural Public Law Conference that was held in 2014, the Centre for Public Law at the University of Cambridge will next year host the […]
A post to draw attention to an interesting administrative-law case decided by the Supreme Court today. The central question in R (Bourgass) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC […]
I am pleased to announce the publication of The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow, which I co-edited with Hanna Wilberg. Inspired by the work of the late Professor Michael Taggart, this collection of essays from across the common law world is concerned with two separate but related themes. First, to what extent and by what means should review […]
I am pleased to be able to share a near-final draft of my chapter in The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Judicial Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow. The book is a collection of essays, inspired by the work of the late Professor Michael Taggart, and edited by Hanna Wilberg and me. It will be published shortly by Hart Publishing. My chapter […]
The recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 marks a turning-point in the role of proportionality […]
I posted here about the decision of Stewart J in R (Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills. The case concerns a challenge to the lawfulness of […]
I have written on several previous occasions — most recently in this post — about the Government’s attempts to restrict access to judicial review through the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill and, in particular, about the attempts of the Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling MP, to justify the Government’s position. As part of ongoing legislative ping-pong between the House of Commons […]
I recently completed work on a book, co-edited with Hanna Wilberg of The University of Auckland, entitled The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow. The book will be published […]
The Supreme Court’s judgment in R (Carlile) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60 (press summary) (judgment) raises some interesting and significant points about the role of the courts when applying the proportionality test in cases concerning interferences with qualified human rights. The central question was whether the Home Secretary had breached the right to freedom […]
