In a new journal article, Stephen Tierney and I consider the constitutional implications of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018
After digging in its heels, the House of Commons Procedure Committee has extracted an undertaking from the Government that the process of scrutinising Brexit-related secondary legislation will function as parliamentarians had envisaged when the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 was being enacted
The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 gives extraordinary law-making powers to the Government. Parliament sought to counterbalance those powers with a bespoke system for scrutinising their exercise. But is the Government now undermining those arrangements?
Brexit is placing the UK constitution under unprecedented strain. This article, originally published online by Prospect magazine, takes stock of where Brexit currently stands in domestic-constitutional terms
Mark Elliott, Jack Williams and Alison L Young introduce The UK Constitution After Miller: Brexit and Beyond — an edited collection published by Hart Publishing which explores the constitutional implications and legacy of the UK Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in the Miller case
The Government has published a White Paper outlining the legislation it will put to Parliament to give effect to the hoped-for Brexit withdrawal agreement. This post considers the constitutional issues raised by the proposed legislation — including its relationship with the just-enacted EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018
In a new paper, I explore what light has been shone on the UK constitution, and on the axiomatic principle of parliamentary sovereignty in particular, by EU membership — and what the post-Brexit constitutional legacy of that membership might be
The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 paves the way for Brexit by providing for the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 and converting EU law into UK law. This post summarises how the Act works and briefly considers some of the key constitutional issues that it raises.
The importance of consistency in decision-making has been increasingly recognised in English administrative law. The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Gallaher, in which consistency is said not to be a free-standing administrative law principle, is thus both surprising and questionable.
In this post, Mark Elliott, Stephen Tierney and Alison L Young consider the implications of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill for human rights protection — and how the Bill might be amended if the protections afforded by the Charter of Fundamental Rights are to be maintained after Brexit
Mark Elliott and Stephen Tierney summarise the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s report on the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, and highlight some of the key constitutional implications raised by the Committee
In a new paper, I examine the way in which judges in the UK respond to ouster clauses — and reflect on what such responses might tell us about the nature of the contemporary British constitution and the courts’ perception of their place within it
Does the Government defeat on clause 9 of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill mean Parliament has ‘taken back control’?
In the Government’s first defeat on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, Parliament has insisted that a withdrawal agreement cannot be implemented without its approval. But does that really mean that Parliament is now in the driving seat when it comes to shaping the terms of Brexit?
In the preliminary agreement concerning the terms of Brexit, the UK Government promises to give EU citizens’ rights direct effect in UK law and to make them legally ironclad unless the legislating giving effect to them is itself expressly repealed. But does the principle of parliamentary sovereignty prevent such a high degree of protection from being accorded to citizens’ rights?
In the Privacy International case, the Court of Appeal accepted that an ouster clause precluded judicial review of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Sales LJ contended that the issue turned on ‘a short point of statutory construction’. The reality, however, is that such cases take the courts into the deepest of constitutional waters.
In this paper, published in a special issue of the University of Queensland Law Journal, I chart the growth of judicial power in the United Kingdom and consider how the proper limits of such power might be identified